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China’s migrant workers have evinced an extraordinary capacity for ardent, courageous, and 
often successful collective action despite living in a one-party state that denies them the right to strike 
and organize and that is capable of draconian political repression. Their protests’ stimuli, repertoires, 
discourses, and capacity for contagion have varied over time and space. Some analysts detect nascent, 
potentially destabilizing class-based politics (e.g., Pun and Lu, 2010), while others (e.g., Elstrom and 
Kuruvilla, 2014) see incipient bread-and-butter labor-management conflict. Both may be right, if only 
because they may be looking at different kinds of cases across this differentiated terrain. In this article, 
we probe the variation and debates by zooming out from the rich literature about labor politics in 
particular firms, localities or sectors1 to a comparison across sectors – specifically, apparel, 
automobiles, construction and electronics. Beyond the analytical findings about explaining protests 
are significant political implications: for even if we find some instances of class-based and potentially 
militant or contagious politics in some sectors, the differences among them are likely to increase the 
fragmentation of labor protest, and, therefore, weaken it overall. 
Labor politics differs across industrial sectors only because they in turn tend to differ along a 
range of important explanans such as gender, skill, labor process, ownership, enterprise size and 
organization, social relations (between management and workers and also among workers), and wage 
levels. Specifically, the apparel and electronics sectors – especially the former – tend heavily to 
employ young women, while automobile manufacturing and construction are heavily male trades. 
Electronics firms in China are vast, often employing hundreds of thousands of workers at a single site 
that resembles a city in itself; the other three tend toward much smaller factories. Electronics and 
automobiles rely on constant-flow assembly lines, a very different labor process, involving different 
skills, forms of labor discipline, and relations among workers, from construction and apparel. Many 
automobile plants are foreign joint ventures, whose management patterns and institutions differ from 
those in smaller, Chinese-owned apparel contractors or vast electronics plants owned by Chinese or 
other Asian firms, or even from foreign-owned construction firms. Apparel, automotive and 
electronics factories are very different from construction sites, mainly because of the nature of the 
labor process and organization. Skill requirements differ too. 
As an analytical concept, sectors are important not in and of themselves – there is, after all, 
nothing magical about the differences among dresses, drive trains, diggers or devices. Rather, they are 
useful analytical categories because and only insofar as different sectors are characterized by somewhat 
distinctive economic, micro-political and social factors and relationships. At the bottom we, like our 
colleagues who have done focused ethnographic work, are interested in the effects of those myriad 
factors on contentious labor politics. And to be sure, as units of analysis, sectors combine them in 
complex ways that do not allow us to neatly isolate those underlying factors. Ideally, we would want 




differentiate them by the full range of potential explanans. But until that is possible – i.e., as long as 
the available materials are restricted to a few score brief, journalistic reports – industrial sectors can 
provide a starting point out of which we can tease tentative hypotheses about some of the overall 
dynamics of protest that may help guide future, more in-depth and nuanced research. Our work, then, 
remains exploratory and inductive. Mindful of the limitations of the available materials, we went into 
this study without textured hypotheses about the effect of the variegated differences among sectors on 
collective action other than that we expected that they would point to some. These qualifications 
notwithstanding, we believe the time has come to begin to move on, however provisionally, from 
research on individual cases and explanatory factors to a more cross-sectional approach that can 
expand the ongoing debate about the nature and complex determinants of migrant workers’ collective 
action. 
We surveyed the online databases of the China Labour Bulletin and the China Strikes 
crowdmap2 to develop a compendium of every instance of migrant workers’ collective action between 
the start of 2010 and the middle of 2013. Of course, even though these two sources are as 
comprehensive as anything available, we cannot argue that the material they provide constitutes the 
universe of instances of such labor protest in China during those years. However, our analysis does not 
depend on our having to do so. For we are not attempting to describe quantitatively the terrain of such 
labor conflict – e.g., how it is distributed over time, space or industrial sector. Rather, we develop a 
qualitative analysis of migrants’ collective action based on the cases we do have. To be sure, insofar as 
there surely are incidents of migrant labor collective action that have eluded our sources, the analysis 
might well change. Of course we can hope that the cases we have found are in a broad sense 
representative of the universe of cases, but we have no basis for arguing that it does. This, then, is 
another respect in which our findings must be treated as tentative and suggestive. 
Moreover, our approach limits the questions we can ask. We are unable to say anything about 
many of the potentially important characteristics of the individual participants: their ages, levels of 
education or skill, home areas, personalities, social networks, and the like. We also cannot get deeply 
into protesters’ underlying forms of consciousness, or even the nuances of discourse that might 
provide clues to them – though we do make an attempt at a rough-and-ready categorization of 
protest discourses based on the reports we deployed. We cannot probe the processes by which 
collective action developed, a truly fascinating and narratively thrilling matter. For all this and more, 
scholars must continue to rely on the rich body of case studies undertaken by our colleagues. 
But we can ask different questions. Most centrally, we attempt to understand how collective 
action differs across the range of enterprises in which migrants work. Our materials turned up four: 
apparel, automobiles, construction, and electronics. Based on their differences along various 
potentially important social, economic and political dimensions, there are good theoretical reasons to 
expect systematic variation in the collective action that took place among them. Our data allow us to 
ask the following questions: 
 
• What repertoires of collective action took place? 
• What stimulated them? More specifically, what were the issues and demands? And were they 
offensive or defensive? 
• In what kinds of discourses did workers engage? 
• Was collective action contagious? 
 
Repertoires 
Migrant workers’ protests evinced a considerable range of virtuosity, from informal bargaining 
to rioting and self-harm or threats of same (table 1).3 Overall, strikes and public demonstrations 




in our data because they are less likely to have featured in news reports; moreover, most are individual 
rather than collective in the first place. In light of the very small number of times they were mentioned, 
it seems prudent not to attempt to interpret those figures further, beyond saying that they are not a 
prominent repertoire of collective action. The very low incidence of slowdowns may seem surprising, 
since they could be thought to involve less risk than strikes. But they may actually involve more 
danger for individual workers, since a slowdown takes place in the direct face of management, who 
can easily single out particular workers for blame, correction and retribution; by contrast, in a strike 
workers leave the shopfloor. Sabotage and factory occupations were relatively infrequent, perhaps 
again because they bring workers into much more direct, face-to-face contact with management that 
the former may find intimidating. 
 























































Apparel 0 2 0 12 10 1 0 1 17 
Automobiles 0 0 1 13 3 0 0 0 13 
Construction 2 2 0 11 12 1 5 3 22 
Electronics 0 0 0 28 13 2 4 5 37 
          
% of N          
Apparel 0% 12% 0% 71% 59% 6% 0% 6%  
Automobiles 0% 0% 8% 100% 23% 0% 0% 0%  
Construction 9% 9% 0% 50% 55% 5% 23% 14%  
Electronics 0% 0% 0% 76% 35% 5% 11% 14%  
 
The most violent repertoires – self-harm and rioting – occurred only in construction and 
electronics, perhaps because, arguably, their labor processes and working conditions are even worse 
than in apparel and automobiles. Construction work is particularly demanding physically, and the 
working conditions extremely difficult, with laborers toiling and often living out of doors – a toxic mix. 
Electronics plants in China are infamous for their grinding pace, elongated hours, and draconian 
regulation backed by severe fines. The near complete absence of violent repertoires in apparel plants is 
a bit of a puzzle. We resist any temptation to link it to the effects of patriarchy on the overwhelmingly 
female character of the labor force, especially since women were involved in protests threatening 
collective suicide in electronics plants. Their complete absence in automobile plants surely has 
everything to do with the stunning success of striking workers in winning significant concessions from 
management quickly, preempting any such escalation. It may result from the fact that automobile 
workers’ demands were offensive – demanding higher wages – rather than defensive in responding to 
management assaults on wages and working conditions (an issue to which we return below). 
In construction, all five cases of actual or threatened self-harm involved disputes over dismissals 
of workers who had claimed their wage arrears, demands that were unsuccessful and in some instances 
met with beatings. In the most extraordinary case, four of nineteen workers involved sat down at the 
entrance to Tsinghua University in Beijing and cut off the tips of their fingers (China Labour Bulletin, 
2010). In another, eleven workers climbed a construction crane and threatened to jump (Lou and Hu, 
2011). Only one of the riots was associated with one of these incidents of self-harm, which means 




In electronics, all four cases of self-harm involved collective suicide threats, three in Foxconn 
plants. This form of protest represents an escalation to the collective level of a wave of widely 
publicized individual suicides at Foxconn in 2010 and 2011.5 In all three of our Foxconn cases, which 
were scattered across the country, workers faced losing their jobs, two because of plant relocations 
and one due to severe harassment designed, workers claimed, to force them to resign. The fourth, in 
Zhenxiang Electronics, was occasioned in precisely the opposite way: workers attempted a collective 
resignation in response to excessive demands for overtime at very low pay, but were told that if they 
did so they would not be paid their wage arrears, at which point three women positioned themselves 
on the roof and threatened to jump (China Labour Bulletin, 2011). None of the five riots that broke 
out in electronics plants was associated with any of these cases of attempted suicide, so there were 
nine in all. 
Three points emerge in conclusion. First, different sectors displayed markedly different forms of 
collective action by migrant workers. Second, violent repertoires were the second most frequent after 
strikes and demonstrations, coming in well ahead of legal and informal ones, slowdowns, and 
occupations and sabotage. Both findings, especially the latter, reflect the poorly institutionalized 
character of contentious labor relations in China. Third, violent repertoires were unevenly distributed 




What drove migrant workers to engage in collective action? Grouped as material are complaints 
about hours, working conditions, wages (including arrears), benefits, employment security, changes in 
ownership, and firm relocation and restructuring. Humanistic grievances include bullying, disrespect 
and violence.  Moral ones are corruption, including management absconding with firm assets. 
Political stimuli involve complaints about enforcement of legal rights and demands for new policies. 
Offensive refers to collective action undertaken not in response to management initiatives that 
threatened or degraded workers’ existing situation, but rather as demands for improvement, often to 
bring workers into line with labor conditions elsewhere in the same sector. 
Table 2 sums up the findings.6 Obviously, material issues predominated across the board. More 
specifically, the most common complaint was about wages and benefits (raised in 64 cases [25 of 
which concerned arrears]), followed by hours and working conditions (21), changes in ownership, 
relocation and restructuring (10), and employment security (6). But they were most prominently 
front and center in automobiles and electronics. 
 
Table 2: Stimuli of Collective Action 
 Material Humanistic and moral Political Offensive N 
Apparel 18 10 1 0 17 
Automobiles 19 3 0 9 13 
Construction 23 6 0 0 22 
Electronics 53 8 1 0 37 
      
% of N      
Apparel 106% 59% 6% 0%  
Automobiles 146% 23% 0% 69%  
Construction 105% 27% 0% 0%  





Workers in all four sectors also voiced humanistic and moral complaints, though they were 
significantly more common in apparel. Here we can fashion a hypothetical explanation around three 
interwoven structures: labor process, management, and gender. In apparel, management enforcement 
of labor discipline depends heavily on direct, personal monitoring. By contrast, in the automotive or 
electronics sectors, it is built more into the routinized and automated labor process of constant-flow 
assembly line production. Moreover, in apparel the monitoring is generally done by male supervisors 
over female workers, setting up a flashpoint of gender-based, face-to-face friction that could 
easily produce humanistic and moral outrage. Artist Jeff Wall’s classic photograph ‘Outburst’ comes 
to mind (figure 1). Though it was staged, it offers an excellent depiction of a typical apparel factory 
shopfloor, with its women working one-by-one at their tables, compared with an electronics assembly 
line. In construction, we hypothesize, such complaints may be less common even though supervision 
is also personal because both the workers and supervisors are overwhelmingly male. Moreover, setting 
gender aside, the multi-tiered subcontracting system of employment (from managers to 
sub-contractors to cellular groups working together under informal leaders) could well provide a 















Jeff Wall, ‘Outrage’  Electronics Assembly Line, China Celestica Technology 
  (http://newshopper.sulekha.com/china-celestica_photo_914309.htm) 
 
Our data confirm the widely held view that most labor strife in China is basically apolitical. 
Only two cases (out of a total of 89) mentioned political demands: the workers in Amphenol 
Electronics (Guangzhou) complained that their union existed ‘in name only’ (Radio Free Asia, 2013), 
and there was an anti-tax riot in Huzhou (Zhejiang) in 2011 (Fung et. al., 2011). 
Finally, aside from the automobile strike wave of 2010, we found not a single case of collective 
action that was not defensive – i.e., stimulated by a specific alleged depredation by management. In 
several cases (one in apparel and two in electronics), workers defending themselves against 
management offensives did compare themselves with fellow workers in similar plants. But that is a 
very different matter than in the offensive automobile strikes, in which such gaps provided the 




How workers expressed their grievances may provide a clue to how they have been conceiving 
their predicament, their relationship to their employers and their fellow workers, and the pathways 




themselves as employees, citizens with rights, human beings entitled to respectful treatment, Chinese 
(in opposition to a foreign employer), rural migrants, oppressed women, and/or members of the 
working class? The question is extremely challenging theoretically, substantively and 
methodologically, and any satisfactory analysis would require a complex combination of ethnographic, 
survey and documentary research; here we can only begin to scratch the surface of the latter. So again, 
as we shift from detailed, ethnographic case studies to a more general, comparative map, from the 
trees to the forest, our claims must remain modest. 
Analysis of collective action discourses requires categorizing workers’ written and oral 
statements, slogans, chants, signs and the like. We fashioned our categories around their discourses, 
rather than out of some theoretical abstraction. There is obviously some subjectivity involved here, 
and several of the categories may require explication. For each of them, then, let us begin by providing 
an example or two. 
 
• Material: ‘We suffer from poor health and poverty.’ ‘Our wages are low compared to others 
in Fengcheng.’ 
• Legal rights: ‘Protect the rights and interests of all Chinese workers.’ 
• Management authority: ‘We earn less than ¥2,000 a month, but we could be subjected to 
fines of ¥50-100 for arriving late or spending more than two minutes in the toilet.’ 
• Humanistic: ‘They don’t treat us like human beings.’ ‘They couldn’t care less if we lived or 
died.’ ‘They treat us like rabbits.’ 
• Nationalist: ‘The [Japanese] owners are blackmailing us Chinese.’ 
• Political: We ‘demonstrate our absolute resolve in protesting…the inability of the judicial 
system to deliver justice.’ ‘We have lost our faith in the Party.’ 
• Moral: ‘Give us back the money from our blood and sweat.’ ‘We are loyal workers who were 
fired by the irresponsible factory.’ 
• Solidaristic: ‘If the company sacks any one of us, we will all walk out and quit.’ ‘The larger 
the event the more trouble.’ 
• Class (making claims on behalf of workers beyond the company): ‘Protect migrant workers’ 
interests.’ ‘Protect the rights and interests of all Chinese workers.’ 
 
Table 3 displays the findings. As we would expect, material themes comprise the most common 
discursive elements across all sectors. Interestingly, though, in automobile manufacturing, they were 
coequal with legal rights and moral claims. Moreover, the discourse in the automobile plants was much 
broader than in any other sector. That may have something to do with these workers’ much greater 
level of confidence as expressed also in their uniquely offensive strike wave. The absence of nationalism 
in apparel and construction workers’ discourses makes perfect sense, of course, since half the apparel 
firms and all the construction firms in our dataset were Chinese. It may be significant that discourses 
involving class and solidarity only appeared among automobile and electronics workers – the two 
sectors with the largest and most modern plants, both of which also use constant-flow assembly line 
labor processes that make workers particularly dependent on each other. But even here, themes of 
class and solidarity were not particularly prominent. What was most on workers’ minds, or at least 




























Apparel 5 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 17 
Automobiles 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 2 0 13 
Construction 7 3 2 0 3 1 0 0 1 22 
Electronics 9 4 8 2 4 1 2 2 2 37 
           
% of N           
Apparel 29% 6% 18% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 6%  
Automobiles 23% 23% 15% 15% 15% 23% 8% 15% 0%  
Construction 32% 14% 9% 0% 14% 5% 0% 0% 5%  
Electronics 24% 11% 22% 5% 11% 3% 5% 5% 5%  
 
 
Timing and Contagion 
What capital and the state in China fear most from the country’s workers are waves of strikes 
and protests. For capital, they could presage broad, across-the-board wage rises, threatening 
profitability and international competitiveness. For the state, they could usher in metastatic political 
instability. The two major (and very different) strike waves that have occurred under the structural 
reforms7 – by laid-off workers in the Northeast in 2002, and by migrant auto workers in 
2010 – therefore rang loud alarm bells among both supporters and opponents of labor activism in 
China. In the end, though, they turned out to be exceptions that proved what is widely thought to be 
the rule in Chinese labor relations – that collective action is, in general, basically cellular. Our study 
complicates this understanding somewhat by uncovering more localized, sector-based forms of 
temporal clustering that are missing from that big picture. But only some of that co-temporality 
reflected actual metastasis of collective action. Nonetheless, we may be seeing here the traces of a yet 
unexplored pattern of clustering that lies between the standard categories of broad protest waves on 
the one hand and cellularity on the other. 
The data appear in figure 2. In the apparel sector, four of the seven collective actions in late 
2011 took place in or around Guangzhou, though none were in the same town, and we have no 
evidence that the workers were in touch with each other; so the spike in the data may just reflect 
random variation. After all, there were only four cases. The spike in the data from May-July 2010 in 
the automotive sector reflects the clearly documented strike wave in automobile plants. While it took 
place across three provinces, in joint ventures with two different Japanese companies (Honda and 
Toyota), workers who went out a few days later had been in communication with the earlier strikers 
or had news about their strikes (Butollo and ten Brink, 2012). In construction, collective action 
spiked in 2011 and 2012 across widely scattered locations, both years in October. Workers in one 
case mentioned the Mid-Autumn Festival in their appeal (Li, 2010), which alerts us to the possibility 
that what we are seeing here is the effect of holiday timing rather than a protest wave. Finally, in 
electronics, there was a clear strike wave in January 2013 at three plants in Jiangxi, in which workers 
communicated with and inspired each other (Chan, 2013). The remaining four were scattered across 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, with no apparent connection except, perhaps, for the timing 












Overall, then, except for the 2010 automobile plant strike wave and one small triad of 
electronics strikes, there is little evidence that collective action among migrant workers even within 
the same sector involved significant direct contagion. Moreover, looking across sectors, the spikes 
occurred at different times, which reinforces the point. Still, capital and the state should resist 
complacency. Butollo and ten Brink argue that the unusual offensive and contagious strikes in the 
auto sector could occur because of effective, energetic leadership, which can happen anywhere, but 
also due to specific structural characteristics of these firms: they employed better educated workers 
who had graduated from technical schools, and the workers understood that the just-in-time 
production system in Japanese automobile production gave them real leverage: shutting down one 
smaller supplier factory, which is where these strikes occurred, can bring the big assembly plants to a 
halt in very short order. Insofar as Chinese industry moves over the coming decades toward more 
sophisticated forms of lean production with more highly trained workers, dangers could lie ahead. For 
the moment, though, the very factors that made for contagion in the automobile sector militate 




How can the variation in Chinese migrant workers’ collective action be explained? For just one 
example, how can the debates between scholars who detect nascent class consciousness and politics 
on the one hand and those who see ‘bread and butter’ conflict on the other be resolved? By zooming 




and electronics sectors, we have begun to detect some qualitative differences that suggest some 
patterns. Our core findings are several. 
 
• Whereas in all sectors strikes and demonstrations were the most common repertoires, and 
legal and informal approaches and slowdowns the least, threatened or actual violence 
(self-harm and rioting), which were in between in terms of frequency, occurred almost 
exclusively in construction and electronics. The reasons may have to do with the arguably 
more brutal labor processes and working conditions in those sectors. 
• Although material stimuli for collective action were the most common in all sectors, here 
again there was a range in terms of other issues. Apparel workers evinced the most concern 
with humane treatment and moral values, which could reflect the directly interpersonal 
forms of supervision and the more heavily female labor force working under male supervisors 
in this sector. 
• Hardly any collective action raised overtly political concerns. 
• Automobile workers were almost alone in waging offensive strikes. 
• Consistent with the above, material issues dominated migrant workers’ discourses in all 
sectors. Yet auto workers evinced the broadest discourses that transcended economic 
complaints by speaking also in terms of legal rights, humanism, nationalism, politics, 
morality, and firm- and even class-based solidarity more than workers in other sectors. 
There may be no contradiction here – i.e., automobile workers’ capacity to go on the 
offensive for material gain may have inclined them to take a grander view of their 
predicament as workers. 
• Movement contagion, generally low in China, was also highly unevenly distributed across 
sectors, concentrating in the automobile sector but not strongly in evidence elsewhere, for 
structural reasons specific to that sector that are themselves unlikely to spread quickly to 
other sectors. But rather than thinking in terms of cellularity vs. broad movements, ongoing 
research should stay attuned to the possibility of small, localized clusters of contagion such 
as those we detected. 
 
Finally, returning to the question of whether Chinese migrants’ collective action presages the 
rise of class-based or bread-and-butter politics, our study suggests that even if there is some evidence 
of the former, the wider sectoral differences we have explored may themselves be fragmenting workers 




1.  For just a few examples, see Chan and Pun (2009); Butollo and ten Brink (2012); Elfstrom and 
Kuruvilla (2014); Pun and Lu (2010); Chan and Pun (2010); Friedman and Lee (2010) and 
Pringle (2013). 
2.  http://www.numble.com/PHP/clbmape.html; https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/ 
3.  Many instances of collective action involved more than one repertoire. Hence, the total of the 
figures in each row exceed the total number (N) of incidents.  
4. It’s interesting that they go together so often in China, compared with the US or the UK, where, 




has a good deal to do with the lack of legal protection and routinized practices for dealing with 
strikes in China. 
5.  We did not include them in our database because they were not, strictly speaking, collective 
action in themselves, even though sixteen of them occurred in something of a wave over the first 
half of 2010. 
6.  The figures for material stimuli as percentages of the number of incidents exceed 100% because 
they all involved more than one specific complaint in this category. 
7.  Waves of strikes and protests were also reported immediately after the June 4, 1989 crackdown, 
in Hangzhou and elsewhere. They had a very different character, of course, originating in and 
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